In February 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld responded to a question at a U.S. Department of Defense news briefing about the lack of evidence that would link the Iraqi government with supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups. He noted:
Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known-knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known-unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown-unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.
This framework has implications, too, for addressing hazing. There’s an underlying assumption about risk management—that the threat that an organization is up against is known. At its core, “risk” exists where there are decisions with multiple outcomes with differing, measurable values. It involves outcomes that can be measured and includes some meaningful quantum of information. In the context of hazing, what actually exists and what’s actually done is something different. Rather than conducting “risk” management, organizations conduct “ambiguity” management. Ambiguity exists where an organization doesn’t know or can’t measure the probability of an event. Because of the unique attributes of a situation, it’s improbable to create a group of outcomes that could occur. This results from a lack of information; ambiguity resides in a world of unknown-unknowns. In unfamiliar contexts, organizations tend to draw conclusions and feel a lack of confidence when past knowledge does not clarify the situation. When decision-makers know they are missing information, they attempt to rule out the unknowns, but if uncertainties still exist the situation is ambiguous.
As may be apparent, an organization will find itself in a better position if it can engage in risk management instead of ambiguity management. Addressing a known or well-defined threat is likely to result in more effective outcomes than addressing an unknown or ill-defined threat. As such, for an organization to transition from ambiguity management to risk management, as trite as it may sound, knowledge is power. In the context of hazing, I suspect that most organizations think they have a firm-enough grip on the issues, the root causes of hazing. As I’ve previously noted, (see prior posts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), much of the analysis on hazing is simple and lacking in nuance. Let’s assume, arguendo, that there are hundreds of factors why hazing exists and persists. Let’s also assume that our knowledge of hazing consists of just a couple dozen factors. As a first step toward meaningful preventative measures and solutions, organizations must significantly deepen their understanding of what undergirds and propels hazing. The first step in that direction is to determine which frameworks and tools are effective in helping determine the best questions to ask and where those answers can be found.
Gregory S. Parks is currently working on a book about hazing in African American fraternities and sororities, tentatively titled Death March.