Just in case Scott McClellan wasn't keeping count, the Center for Public Integrity was: at least 935 falsehoods told by the president and his aides in the runup to the war.
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Just in case Scott McClellan wasn't keeping count, the Center for Public Integrity was: at least 935 falsehoods told by the president and his aides in the runup to the war. Need help remembering that number?

"935 Lies" is from Harry's upcoming CD, "Songs of the Bushmen," to be released July 1 on digital platforms including iTunes and Amazon. This poignant musical satire pays homage to cabinet members and advisors including Scooter Libby ("No Cooler for Scooter'), Condoleezza Rice ("Gym Buds") and Donald Rumsfeld ("Stuff Happens"), to name a few...

UPDATE: Why isn't this on the front page today? Quien sabe. But the long-awaited Phase Two of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report on intel and Iraq is out this morning, and the bipartisan majority reached some interesting conclusions:

The Committee's report cites several conclusions in which the Administration's public statements were NOT supported by the intelligence. They include:

Ø Statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa'ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa'ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence.

Ø Statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information.

Ø Statements by President Bush and Vice President Cheney regarding the postwar situation in Iraq, in terms of the political, security, and economic, did not reflect the concerns and uncertainties expressed in the intelligence products.

Ø Statements by the President and Vice President prior to the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate regarding Iraq's chemical weapons production capability and activities did not reflect the intelligence community's uncertainties as to whether such production was ongoing.

Ø The Secretary of Defense's statement that the Iraqi government operated underground WMD facilities that were not vulnerable to conventional airstrikes because they were underground and deeply buried was not substantiated by available intelligence information.

Ø The Intelligence Community did not confirm that Muhammad Atta met an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in 2001 as the Vice President repeatedly claimed.

Additionally, the Committee issued a report on the Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The report found that the clandestine meetings between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and Paris were inappropriate and mishandled from beginning to end. Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz failed to keep the Intelligence Community and the State Department appropriately informed about the meetings. The involvement of Manucher Ghobanifer and Michael Ledeen in the meetings was inappropriate. Potentially important information collected during the meetings was withheld from intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials. Finally, senior Defense Department officials cut short internal investigations of the meetings and failed to implement the recommendations of their own counterintelligence experts.

The 936th lie: the CIA made us do it.

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