In the two years since the publication of our book Invisible History: Afghanistan's Untold Story we have had the chance to address dozens of forums and radio audiences around the United States about Afghanistan. It has been an illuminating exercise, not so much in terms of what Americans understand about the Afghanistan/Pakistan region (which unfortunately isn't very much) but by the way it reveals how Americans are struggling to catch up with a world that seems to have left them behind. A morning-drive-time radio talk show host in Chicago wanted to know whether a nuclear bomb dropped on the Hindu Kush wouldn't solve the problem. When we replied that using a nuclear weapon to kill a few thousand suspected terrorists would kill millions of innocent people, he responded abruptly before cutting us off: The Japanese got the message when we dropped it on them.
Most people are confused about the America they find themselves in, in the 21st century. They wonder where "their" America went. According to the popular mythology, the U.S. started the decade as the world's lone hyper-power, beholden to none. It ends the first decade of the new millennium as a debt-hobbled-capitalist shell, beholden to
and a host of oil-rich medieval Middle-East Sheikdoms. Americans are frustrated and resentful, denying any responsibility for the ongoing Afghan fiasco while expressing anger and often disbelief that our leadership has refused to learn the lessons of Vietnam and taken us on yet another mindless ride into a hopeless quagmire.
When we are asked why the U.S. is still in Afghanistan after a decade, we explain that America's DNA profile has been all over that country since 1973. While no one was looking, the CIA's secret mission became entangled with Pakistan's support for Afghanistan's small core of foreign-trained right wing Islamic extremists. Thanks to President Jimmy Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, this entanglement blossomed into a marriage following the 1978 Marxist coup and a full-blown commitment to holy war and the Islamization of Pakistan - long before the Soviet invasion of 1979.
The United States continued to support the right wing extremists all through the 1980s and then (in order to serve the interests of Pakistan's military and Saudi/American oil conglomerates) the CIA helped Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) to establish the Taliban. The Taliban's inability to totally conquer Afghanistan and their close relationship with the Arab extremists known as Al Qaeda challenged this American relationship. But it was the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Nairobi and the near sinking of the U.S.S. Cole in Aden harbor in 2000 that strained U.S./Taliban relations to the breaking point.
We then explain that for very much the same reasons that the Soviet Union overreacted to extremist provocations on their southern border in December 1979, the United States invaded Afghanistan following the events of 9/11. The intention was to drive the Taliban out of power and root out, intercept, kill or capture Al Qaeda terrorists and their leader Osama bin Laden, the reputed 9/11 architect. This information usually produces audible groans and looks of profound despair, followed by the question, why has none of this happened? That answer, we now believe has been revealed.
In a June 24, New York Times article titled,
, the authors maintain that according to Afghan officials,
personally offered to broker a deal between
leadership including Sirajuddin Haqqani's terror network and his Al Qaeda allies. The report also maintained that Kayani and his spy chief, Lt. General Ahmad Shuja Pasha agreed with Afghan president Karzai that the U.S. effort in Afghanistan was doomed to fail "and that a postwar Afghanistan should incorporate the Haqqani network, a longtime Pakistani asset."
Wiretaps long ago revealed General Kayani as an extremist sponsor playing a double game, who referred to
have publicly linked Pakistan's ISI to terror activities. Reports of
linger unresolved. But does the Times' revelation of an active Pakistani military collusion with Al Qaeda-conduit Haqqani and Washington's admitted "nervousness" about it, mean that the U.S./Pakistani relationship has finally been pushed to the breaking point?
The United States has spent a decade and hundreds of billions of dollars chasing Osama bin Laden and his mysterious organization known as Al Qaeda around the world. It has given billions more to Pakistan's military to fight Al Qaeda terrorism. The U.S. continues to trample standards of international law by executing suspected terrorists (including Americans) without trial and at the same time suspends civil liberties at home. Pakistan's offer and Hamid Karzai's receptiveness to it represents a checkmate move. Whether anyone in Washington can admit it or not, Kayani has exposed the "war on terror" and its Bill of Rights-busting USA Patriot Act, as a tragic deception.
by the Institute for the Study of War's Jeffrey Dressler picked up on the glaring incongruities of the rapidly devolving scenario.
"The Haqqanis rely on Al Qaeda for mass appeal, funding, resources and training, and in return provide Al Qaeda with shelter, protection and a means to strike foreign forces in Afghanistan and beyond. Any negotiated settlement with the Haqqanis threatens to undermine the raison d'etre for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan over the past decade." But if the raison d'etre for American involvement over the last ten years has made the Haqqanis and Al Qaeda even stronger than they were before, then perhaps the time has come to consider that the raison for the war on terror has been revealed as a double-cross.
reports that $1½ billion dollars of Saudi Arabian money has flowed into Afghanistan from Haqqani and Al Qaeda controlled territory in North Waziristan over the past four years and the
In the 1980s the U.S. with Saudi Arabian backing went out of its way to finance and train the Haqqanis under the auspices of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. According to numerous sources, a good part of the ISI/Hekmatyar operation involved assassinating Afghan nationalists to ensure that a moderate coalition government in Kabul could never be achieved. According to declassified U.S. government documents from the early 1970s, the focus on controlling Afghanistan even then was viewed as centered on a "Chinese-Iranian-Pakistani-Arabian peninsula Axis with U.S. support." Thanks to Pakistani General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, there is little reason to think that the Taliban, Haqqani network and Al Qaeda are any less connected to their ultimate goals today than they were forty years ago.
Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould are the authors of
published by City Lights. Their next book
will be published February, 2011. Visit their website at
Copyright © 2010 Gould & Fitzgerald All rights reserved
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