As the Trump Administration enters 2018, it can be sure that one major national security issue will remain front and center on its agenda: the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The recent testing of nuclear explosive devices and ballistic missiles, including a potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) presents a qualitatively new threat to the United States and its regional allies, South Korea and Japan. However, the longstanding North Korean threat to Seoul precludes any serious consideration of preventive military action by the United States to address this nuclear missile threat. Clearly understanding the nature and rationale of the North Korean nuclear weapons program in the context of the current state of security affairs on the Korean peninsula provides a framework for assessing potential policy options for the United States. Unfortunately, there are few good options, but a robust, comprehensive policy of containment of North Korea may be the only viable policy alternative.
The New Threat: The North Korean Nuclear Missile Program
With the successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile with an estimated range of approximately 8000 km, North Korea has moved close to achieving a nuclear deterrent capability that would hold many American cities at risk, and thus has dramatically increased the direct threat to the United States. This is certainly an unwelcome and troubling event, but it is unsurprising given the recent history of North Korea’s testing program under the leadership of Kim Jong Un.
As several experts have noted, the series of missile and nuclear tests over the course of the last two years represents a more focused and logical progression, seemingly constructed with the objective of developing a robust, reliable, and operationally flexible nuclear force. Building upon intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets within the region (like U.S. bases on Okinawa and Japan and perhaps Guam) and existing short-range rocket and artillery forces holding Seoul and U.S. forces in Korea at risk, the Kim regime now possesses a spectrum of capabilities to deter any attack on the regime. While progress toward the critical goal of miniaturization of nuclear warheads for these new missiles remains uncertain, it can be assumed that such a capacity is within reach.
Once reliable warheads can be produced to outfit this growing missile force, North Korea will possess the capabilities to implement what has been termed as an “asymmetric escalation” strategy. Pyongyang would consider the use of nuclear weapons early in a potential crisis or conventional military conflict to avoid catastrophic military defeat and to ensure the survival of the regime. Relying heavily on a range of nuclear capabilities, such a strategy envisions the launch of a limited nuclear strike to prevent conventional military defeat and deter further escalation by the adversary. Should this fail, North Korea would have the ability to threaten or attack regional targets, thus expanding the conflict and raising the costs to force the adversary to relent. Finally, with some numbers of ICBMs in reserve, the Kim regime would maintain the ability to target the United States homeland as a last resort to deter attempted regime change and maintain power.
The presence of a diverse, reliable, operational nuclear missile capability is indeed a new and unwelcome development in the long troubled relationship between the United States and North Korea. It certainly seems to deviate from the early nuclear aspirations of Kim’s father, Kim Jong Il, who seemed to view the mere possession of an active nuclear weapons program and perhaps a rudimentary missile program as a sufficient deterrent and (perhaps more importantly) as a source of leverage for extracting material benefits from the international community. Kim Jong Un seems to view the possession of a functional nuclear arsenal as a necessary means to ensure the survival of his regime and therefore nature of the nuclear weapons program has improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms under his direction. This progress has, in turn significantly increased the threat to the United States and its allies in East Asia.
The Constant Intractable Challenge: Seoul Held Hostage
What is not new in the current situation is the persistent North Korean military threat to South Korea’s capital, Seoul, and to U.S. military forces and civilians there. Seoul is a bustling, vibrant and densely populated city of approximately 10 million people, though almost double that number (approximately 24 million) live in the surrounding areas of “Metropolitan Seoul.” A large number of American citizens (approximately 110,000) also live in South Korea, beyond the 28,500 uniform U.S. military personnel deployed there.
Seoul is also only 35 miles from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating dividing the Korean peninsula. Experts claim that approximately 1000 long-range conventional artillery pieces and rocket launchers are deployed by North Korea along the DMZ with ranges that can target Seoul. Some skeptics argue that these capabilities, while able to inflict significant damage and civilian loss of life, are insufficient to transform the South Korean capital into a “sea of fire” as the Kim regime has threatened over time. However, North Korea has also deployed a significant number of short-range missiles that could potentially be equipped with rudimentary nuclear warheads, and most experts agree that North Korea possesses one of the world’s largest chemical weapons programs and also likely has a significant biological weapons program. These are important factors to consider.
Under almost any scenario, even where the United States is extremely effective in locating North Korean artillery and rocket sites and assuming air superiority, it is estimated that thousands of South Korean civilians would die within the opening hours of the conflict. The use of chemical or biological weapons possessed by North Korean forces exacerbates this challenge and also introduces serious risks to U.S. and South Korean troops attempting to defend the South. In short, regardless of the state of the nuclear weapons program, North Korea has effectively held Seoul hostage, confronting the U.S. with a virtually impossible challenge.
This unfortunate reality, more than any growing nuclear capability, has confounded U.S. policy over the past twenty years and makes almost any consideration of a preventive attack on North Korea incomprehensible, whether a limited operation narrowly focused on neutralizing the nuclear weapons program, or a larger-scale campaign aimed at removing the Kim regime. In the former case, escalation dynamics could easily result in a conflagration that spirals out of control, while in the latter the Kim regime would have little reason to embrace restraint. In both cases, it would seem that Seoul and its residents would pay a very high price and a U.S. ally would bear the brunt of the pain and suffering from a unilateral U.S. decision.
Those who nevertheless advocate for a military solution to the North Korean nuclear problem must first reconcile the likelihood of severe consequences—if not an outright humanitarian cataclysm—in Seoul. They should first assume significant civilian casualties and the potential economic costs of recovery and reconstruction and then consider the expected costs, benefits and risks of attacking the North Korean program. Given available, open-source estimates, there is little ambiguity to such an analytical exercise. Similarly, for those who look back and blame past administrations for “failing” to resolve the problem, consider how such a potential catastrophe would have been received in the attempt to destroy a latent program. The frustration of such a position is completely understandable, but frustration is not a strategy.
The threat to the United States is real and growing and given Kim’s erratic nature, it is not inconceivable that he may engage in risky behavior with the mistaken notion that his new strategic capabilities will deter his adversaries from effectively responding. An unprovoked attack on the United States would still seem improbable precisely because of the unambiguous capacity of the U.S. to annihilate his nation and end the Kim family dynasty. Nonetheless, provocative rhetoric and actions by Kim toward South Korea or Japan may increase tensions in the region to the point of precipitating a diplomatic crisis. This is far from an optimal state of affairs, but we must live in the world as it is, not as we wish it was.
The Only Viable Policy Choice: Robust Containment
What is to be done? The only viable policy for the United States and its allies in the region and around the world is containment. The effective isolation of North Korea from the international community and persistent application of all forms of available pressure—military deterrence, economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation—should be utilized to prevent Pyongyang from realizing any perceived benefits from its purusit of nuclear weapons and consistent rejection of international rules and norms. Under the Obama and Trump administrations, the United States has taken prudent steps toward the construction of a robust policy of regional containment of North Korea and has generated extensive support across the international community. This should continue to be the focus of a firm, measured, and sensible U.S. approach.