At the request of the Department of Interior, the National Academy of Engineering
to study the causes of the blowout of BP's Mississippi Canyon Block 252 well, dubbed Macondo. The investigation of the blowout started in June, but news was made yesterday as the committee publicly interviewed members of BP's internal investigation team for the first time, as well as other parties. You'll recall that BP's report,
as "self serving",
. You'll also recall that of the eight failures identified by BP as the causes of the blowout, BP only took partial responsibility for two, completely ignoring key issues such as casing design and circulation prior to the cement job. BP's team, led by Mark Bly, BP Group Head of Safety and Operations, placed primary blame for the disaster on Transocean, Halliburton, and Weatherford. Their conclusions, transferring blame to others rather than identifying the true causes, called the entire report into question.
Yesterday, during the meeting, the Academy committee criticized the report pointing out that BP drew their conclusions without interviews of all involved or even inspecting the rig, which is still on the bottom, as well as the lack of available evidence. Najmedin Meshkati, a professor at the Viterbi School of Engineering at the University of Southern California, wondered why BP didn't investigate organizational issues and rig scheduling, which could have caused worker fatigue, contributing to the confusion prior to the well blowout. In criticizing the BP report, Meshkati said,
"How could you call this great work accident investigation ... and not addressing human performance issues and organizational issues and decision-making issues?"
Under questioning, about BP ignoring the confusion and possible distraction of the crew with other activities, Bly said that,
"It wasn't intended to be anything that it isn't. It was a good contribution and a good foundation for further work for BP itself and others."
"We didn't see it to be an unsafe operation as it was being executed."
This panel, stocked with engineers and scientists, is much more likely to come up with meaningful conclusions about the causes of the BP well blowout, as opposed to the President's commission, which is staffed with academians, environmentalists, and politicians. As I am watching this morning's hearings of the President's Commission in its third session, it is becoming even more clear as, so far, testimony focused on booming and skimming and flow rate, with little time spent by witness Doug Suttles on the subsea response or causes. As opposed to the National Academy Engineering panel, the President's panel continues to focus on investigating what happened environmentally after the blowout as opposed to seeking out the actual causes of the blowout.