For the firs time in nine years, the Pakistani government has managed to hold direct talks with one prominent secessionist tribal chief from Balochistan in a fresh attempt to end the ongoing violent insurgency in the gas-rich province. Suleman Daud, who holds the historically prestigious, yet presently symbolic and powerless, tribal title of the "Khan of Kalat", recently met with a three-member delegation sent out by the government in London to persuade him to end his self-imposed exile and return to Balochistan.
In September 2006, Daud convened an unprecedented Jirga or a grand gathering of the Baloch tribal chiefs, the first of its kind in 130 years, in reaction to the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti, 79, a key Baloch opposition leader who was killed on the instructions of the then Pakistani military dictator General Pervez Musharraf.
Daud was so upset with Bugti's killing that he not only joined the pro-independent Balochistan camp and went on self-imposed exile but he even publicly promised that he would take the state of Pakistan to the International Court of Justice in The Hague for allegedly infringing the Baloch sovereignty. He insists that Pakistan had forcefully occupied Balochistan in 1948 and the ICJ should help in ending that occupation.
The British government granted Daud political asylum and he has been living there since then. However, he never proceeded with his plans to file a case against Islamabad as he had promised in the grand Jirga. Sources close to him frequently cite the lack of financial resources as the main reason for his failure to fulfill his promise while his opponents blame him for using this as a gimmick to collect donations. The truth lies in between these speculations.
Daud would indeed require millions of dollars to complete his ambition and the Baloch diaspora is not known for making such generous donations while Daud himself comes form a financially stable background that he would probably not need public donations to survive and thrive. Nonetheless, he has not publicly stated how much money he actually collected in his campaign from those who supported his endeavors to submit a legal case against Pakistan nor has he explained what factors deterred him from going to the ICJ.
When Daud initially disclosed his ambitions, he generated tremendous excitement and some kind of unrealistic expectations among the supporters of a free Balochistan. He suddenly drew much media attention while he also alarmed the Pakistani authorities. Somewhat unprepared over the robust response to his plans, Dawood felt his life was at risk inside Pakistan and decided to go overseas where several other Baloch leaders were already living in exile.
Daud was an important figure in Balochistan's tribal circles because of the historic importance of the institution of the Khanate of Kalat but he had no experience in politics or guerilla warfare. Hence, an exiled Daud, who even did not go to the ICJ, did not pose any serious threats to Pakistan's interests. Because of this, Islamabad did not complain about his overseas activities. Neither the Home Ministry ever registered any criminal cases against him nor did they accuse him of running any of Baloch insurgent groups. That does not mean that Daud did not contribute to the ongoing Baloch freedom movement. He contributed on a totally different front:
While in exile, Daud began to cultivate productive relations with American and European lawmakers in order to create awareness about and seek support for the Baloch movement. His efforts, for example, culminated in an unprecedented 2012 hearing at the U.S. Congress that backed the demand for a free Baloch state. In spite of Pakistan's vehement diplomatic agitation against a hearing about its "internal matters" at the U.S. Congress, a group of American legislators led by Republican Representative Dana Rohrabacher defended their move saying their support for the Baloch right to self-determination was consistent with the values the founding fathers of the United States had espoused.
For nearly a decade, the Baloch leaders have rejected all government offers to negotiate because they point out that Islamabad has more sticks than carrots while dealing with the Baloch. The mere fact that Daud agreed to talk to the government delegation is a major breakthrough for the government although sources say that he has refused to return home because of the government's failure to end human rights violations in Balochistan.
In addition, he has proposed a new Jirga in which all tribal chiefs should be invited to discuss the conflict. If that is one of his key demands, it should be taken as an indication for his willingness to return to Balochistan. Islamabad will probably concede to this demand. Any Jirga that is promised, organized or facilitated by the government simply means that Islamabad is assuring to protect Daud's tribal status and even willing to bring some other tribal chiefs under his umbrella.
The immediate question is who are going to be the winners and the losers of this breakthrough? There are mixed gains and losses. There is one reason why Daud managed to establish good ties with the members of the American Congress and also posed himself worthy of the Pakistani government's communication: his undisputed status as a tribal leader in a region where most other tribal positions are disputed and have multiple contenders.
Unlike Daud, the other key Baloch tribes currently participating in the insurgency, such as the Marris and the Bugtis, are divided in the anti and pro-government camps. Pakistan has already planted its loyalists as the local heads of these tribes and those opposing the government and claiming to be the genuine successors of the positions are all forced to live in exile. Daud has been lucky that he has not been replaced in all these years of his exile although the army and the intelligence agencies have prepared a Plan B to deal with him. They have been grooming his eldest son, who is, ironically, unconditionally and avowedly pro-Pakistan, to replace the father should the latter refuses to negotiate or reconcile.
Since Daud has no political influence and guerrilla constituency in Balochistan, the resumption of an active life as a prominent tribal chief is all he will receive in return of a bargain from the government. If he does not return, he will lose his remaining tribal title to his own son. The negative side of negotiating with the government is potential opposition he will attract from the fellow Baloch leaders and organizations who are still unwilling to abandon their movement. Yet, this is a great time for the government to lure Daud because some of the Baloch insurgent groups and individual leaders are currently busy in severe infighting. Daud has never been a decisive figure in the Baloch insurgency but whether he now chooses to stay with the pro-independence comrades or singly negotiates with Islamabad will still have a significant impact on the Baloch insurgency.