“Where riches hold the dominion of the heart, God has lost His authority,” so wrote John Calvin amid religious upheaval in Europe in the 16th century. A pertinent expression disclosing an underlying factor that enabled the Reformation movement to spread like wildfire. History is riddled with clues to help us comprehend the causes that led to the emergence of Donald Trump and neo-fascist elements in the West.
Underpinning the theological contest during the Reformation, for example, was a revolution against the monopolization of wealth and power that the Catholic Church, and the oppressive European monarchies it supported, represented—a sentiment echoed by the chorus chiding the “1%” today. It was also from the Reformation that our modern social contract of enfranchised citizenry and public welfare as the focus of government found its roots.
Among the important ideas to gather momentum was the limiting of the Church’s role in state affairs and redefining a nation’s sovereignty away from the monarch and to the people. "The people are by nature and in time prior and superior to their governors and more powerful than they,” wrote Johannes Althusius, a German Calvinist, in the early 17th century.
The conception of democratic political thought in the 16th and 17th centuries thus emerged as a check on elites, which, under the guise of divine authority, abused their wealth and power and brought untold suffering upon the millions whom they were tasked to serve. This concept subsequently nurtured the growth of socio-economic and political movements geared toward public welfare and remain constant today, from trade unions to human rights groups.
History has repeatedly shown that when elites push too far in their pursuit of wealth and power, the lower classes revolt.
The relationship between elites and lower classes has been mostly tenuous, and at times such as the Reformation outright hostile, throughout human history. And social contracts have been written and rewritten to address these power dynamics. History has repeatedly shown that when elites push too far in their pursuit of wealth and power, the lower classes revolt and attempt to rewrite the social contract to check the impulses of elites while ensuring public welfare.
It was certainly a major factor that fueled and sustained the Reformation, and indeed other moments of social and political upheavals—from the French Revolution to the Arab Spring. Political instability is almost certain when the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few is so great that pressure on ordinary citizens mounts to an intolerable level. Such grievances are likely to result in expressions of rejection of the status quo, although not necessarily in forms that may benefit those aggrieved.
For example, much literature has been written connecting the failed, corrupt and repressive governance of Arab regimes and the proliferation of violent Islamic extremism. While Islamic radical groups will not improve the socio-economic and political conditions in the region, should they ever assume power, they do offer an avenue of rejection against the status quo that is alluring to many young, impoverished individuals suffering under such a system.
As evidenced by the rise of Trump and neo-fascist groups in the West, modern-day Western societies are not immune to this development. Elites and lower classes in the West contest over the distribution of power and wealth as they do in all other societies of the world. However, the democratic system of the West has largely succeeded in imposing parameters on such a contest, as the Reformation authors who began piecing its original concept five centuries ago intended. The democratic system is designed to absorb the tensions in society, preventing either extreme from emerging—the absolute, tyrannical rule of elites or its opposite, enforced communism.
But a democratic system remains an imperfect and fragile one, as President Barack Obama recently noted. With history as our guide, it can be safely assumed that elites will always strive to further their position irrespective of time or political context. It explains why major corporations and the wealthy have worked and continue to work assiduously to manipulate the American political system to their favor. It explains their enormous financial contribution to political parties—super PACs spent a record amount in the 2016 election campaign—and their insistence on the right to contribute financially in electoral campaigns without limits—a wish granted after the Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling in 2010, which Obama acutely warned at the time, “this ruling strikes at our democracy itself." It explains their endless mission to weaken trade unions and fight against improving workers conditions—America woefully underperforms Europe for leave entitlements and minimum wage. It explains their extensive lobbying efforts for laws that work to their benefit—from reduced regulation on the finance industry to tax cuts for the wealthy.
The original concept of democracy placing public welfare as its highest concern is eroding in America’s political system.
The original concept of democracy placing public welfare as its highest concern is eroding in America’s political system. Through financial donations and lobbying, elites have succeeded in transforming the legislative branch of government to being almost entirely subservient to their interests. Republicans weren’t shy in stating that passing their current tax plan, which would widen the rich-poor gap even further and add $1.5 trillion in debt, was necessary to appease wealthy donors. The Republican tax plan is perhaps the clearest admission yet that America’s political system has reverted to serving the interests of the elites—the very outcome the democratic system was designed to insulate against.
This current trend has, however, been ongoing for decades, and we are only now seeing its political ramifications. Over the past four decades, wealth has increasingly gone into the pockets of the richest in the nation, with the middle-class simultaneously shrinking. Where the middle-class made up 62% of America’s wealth in 1970 (compared to 29% of upper-class), it now only holds 43% of the nation’s wealth (compared to 49% of upper-class). The share of adults living in middle-income households has dropped from 61% in 1971 to 50% today, with the lowest class expanding from 16% to 20% in the same timeframe. The bottom 90% of earners have seen their wages rise 15% since 1980, while earnings of the top 1% have skyrocketed 138% in the same period. As Vanguard’s chief global economist Joe Davis put it this month, the trend has continued under the watch of both Republican and Democratic administrations.
While this has been gradual over four decades, it reached its precipice in the 2007-2008 global recession. The subprime crisis brought the growing socio-economic disparity to the fore and accentuated its fault lines. The middle class shrank even further, and continues to do so. Despite economic recovery in the United States since the recession, and reaching almost full employment (unemployment rate currently 4.1%), real wages of the bottom 85% of American workers actually declined between 2007-2014, when inflation and cost of living are factored. Meanwhile, the top 15% of earners have seen their real wages increase. Corporations are registering record profits, with several major companies stockpiling cash and not passing down profits to lower-level employees.
The rise of anti-establishment movements on both the Right and Left is a popular rejection of the Centrist economic policies that have overseen income disparity and the dilution of the middle-class over the past four decades.
The correlation between widening income inequality and the re-emergence of fringe movements in the West cannot be overlooked. Indeed, the rise of anti-establishment movements on both the Right and Left is a popular rejection of the Centrist economic policies that have overseen income disparity and the dilution of the middle-class over the past four decades. As this socio-economic trend continues unabated, the pool of angered citizens feeling neglected by the system will expand, and thus the growing appeal of extreme movements rejecting the status quo.
As with the case of Islamic extremism in the Middle East, socio-economic grievances can be manipulated into socially divisive and cultural issues that do not necessarily address the original grievances, but still enable an outlet to reject the political order. Extremist groups such as white supremacists and neo-Nazis indeed offer such a rejection, and have intertwined racial ideology with economic anger in recruitment campaigns in the United States. Their emergence is a legacy of the 2007-08 global recession. Reviewing the outcomes of such trends in history suggest that further political instability is on the horizon should elites continue to concentrate wealth and power and the pressure on lower classes escalate.
The more Americans feel neglected by the current political order, the more attractive far-right rejectionist movements become. Political thinkers were warning of this possibility before Trump even declared his candidacy. Writing in 2014, Francis Fukuyama noted the decline in America’s democratic political system and warned that “there is no guarantee that the situation will change much without a major shock to the political order”—a major shock according to Fukuyama being a war or revolution. Obama echoed that warning recently when pointing to the dangers of going down the path of Nazi Germany, “You have to tend to this garden of democracy, otherwise things can fall apart fairly quickly.” A prescient warning indeed, knowing full well how violent historical attempts to rewrite the social contract have been—not least the Reformation.