Sergiy Taran is the Director of the Kiev-based International Democracy Institute think tank, and the head of the Board of the Center of Sociological and Political Researches "Sotsiovimir". Taran is also an activist and political scientist specializing in post-Communist Ukrainian politics. His opinions on Ukrainian politics have appeared in numerous leading Western publications like the Financial Times, BBC, and the Guardian. Taran agreed to sit down for an interview with me on July 6, 2015. The transcript of my interview is below:
As an activist and analyst, you have witnessed both the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2013-14 Maidan protests in Ukraine. How did the dynamics of the two revolutions differ?
Sergiy Taran: The dynamics of the two revolutions were very different. Firstly, the Orange Revolution was about how politicians rule people, and people were much more radical than politicians. The Maidan revolution was a revolution of dignity. People put politicians forward, and politicians were often much more radical than people. Secondly, The Orange Revolution occurred during an election cycle, and peaceful revolutions generally occur during election periods. Votes are counted and the international community gets involved to ensure a peaceful transition of power. The Maidan protests occurred outside of an election cycle, which explains the violence and this made a peaceful transition more difficult. The protesters wanted to change the government in a non-constitutional way. It was a John Locke style revolution where people rebelled because the government did something wrong. Thirdly, the Orange Revolution was about securing free and fair elections. The Maidan revolution was about something much deeper. It was about civilizational choice, identity politics and whether Ukraine should support European integration.
After the Orange Revolution, Ukraine failed to implement pledged institutional reforms and the quality of its democracy backslid. What do you think caused this deterioration?
Sergiy Taran: There was a great deal of optimism surrounding Viktor Yushchenko but as soon as he rose to power, people began fighting with each other and populism rose. It was a product of inexperience with democracy and because the Orange Revolution won but did not win strategically.
To what extent do you think Ukrainian public opinion favors NATO membership and closer integration with Europe?
Sergiy Taran: First of all, I would like to emphasize that Ukraine has always been a pro-European country. With regards to NATO, there was a split between supporters and opponents during the Orange Revolution. Right after the start of the current war, the debates on NATO membership and whether Ukraine should be pro-Russian or pro-European ended. The consensus in the Ukrainian parliament is almost unanimously in support of NATO and Europe. The NATO consensus is due to the war, people do not want to ally with the aggressor.
Turning to the Maidan protests, the primary initial instigator for the revolution in Ukraine in late 2013 was Yanukovych's rejection of the EU association agreement. Do you think Yanukovych's decision was primarily motivated by a superior Russian financial offer as it is often speculated?
Sergiy Taran: Yanukovych was partially motivated by a superior Russian financial offer but that is not the entire story. Russia intimidated Yanukovych by insisting that if he accepted the EU offer, it would be the end of his political career. Russia threatened to cut off economic relations with Eastern Ukraine, which would have destroyed the support base for Yanukovych. Another reason why Yanukovych was motivated by Russia not to sign the agreement was information about the case against him. Yanukovych was imprisoned during the Soviet Union yet no case file has appeared. I believe that it is in Russia.
In addition to the economic incentives, it is been speculated that Yanukovych rejected the EU association agreement in part due to EU pressure to release Yulia Tymoshenko from prison. To what extent did the Tymoshenko case motivate Yanukovych's decision-making?
Sergiy Taran: I think the Yulia Tymoshenko case was important but it was not the primary driver of Yanukovych's conduct. Two years before the Maidan revolution, Tymoshenko was arrested. In 2012, Tymoshenko's political party attempted to challenge Yanukovych's Party of Regions but her supporters were paid off and the challenge folded. Tymoshenko supporters tried to mobilize party members and try to create a kind of Maidan in Kiev, but only 200 people from the entire city came to the streets. Yanukovych allowed these demonstrations to occur because the fact that only 200 people turned out for them would undermine Tymoshenko's credibility as a challenger.
Russian officials and the Russian state media have frequently claimed that the Maidan protests were not a spontaneous popular revolution but a coup orchestrated by the CIA and/or other Western agencies. Is there any truth to these allegations? And to what extent, do you think the United States was involved in the Maidan revolution?
Sergiy Taran: These allegations are not true; at first, the West did not saying anything. I remember December 14, 2013, the first night when the Yanukovych regime tried to disperse the Maidan protests by force and the people resisted. That night the White House made a clear statement; until then, they were not involved. There are a lot of conspiracy theories. One of them is that the White House exchanged Ukraine for Syria, promising not to intervene in Ukraine if Russia backed down in Syria. Even if this theory is true, the deal fell through, the night of Yanukovych's first crack down. The theory that American money determined the outcome of the Maidan protests is also incorrect. If money was the determinant Yanukovych would have stayed in power as he had access to a lot more funds than any opposition leader.
Russia intervened militarily in the aftermath of the Maidan protests, but restricted its response to the Orange Revolution to rhetorical criticism. What explains the Putin regime's use of hard power in 2014?
Sergiy Taran: I think that Russia believed that it was much stronger in 2014 than in 2005. Putin also perceived the West and Obama to be weak. Putin expected that the Russian military would be greeted with widespread support when it intervened in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. He did not envision so much resistance to Russia's military intervention, from Russian-speaking populations.
One explanation for Russia's military intervention commonly mentioned in the West is the idea that Putin feared the Maidan protests would spread to Moscow, as Yanukovych and Putin both led kleptocratic regimes. Do you think this theory has validity, and how similar were the Putin and Yanukovych regimes in their style of governance?
Sergiy Taran: I do not think that Yanukovych should be compared to Putin; his regime more closely resembles post-Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Firstly, in Ukraine, we have cleavages within the political elites, so the government and opposition can alternate. In Russia, Putin is the only one. Secondly, change in power is accepted in Ukraine. Like in Europe, politics operates in a cyclical manner. In Russia, change in power and political revolutions are considered to be bad things. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, there is more openness for change but those cities represent only a small part of Russia. Government is considered to be something sacred. In Ukraine, you can make jokes about the government or the president, which is not acceptable in Russia. Thirdly, Ukraine had media independence while Russia did not. Fourthly, Ukrainians believe they should be part of Europe which is not a sentiment shared by Russians. In Ukraine, democracy is part of the national identity; nationalism is liberal democratic nationalism. Ukraine tried to break away from Russian imperialism so human rights, democracy and nationalism are the same. In Russia, democracy does not have the same connection to nationalism as nationalism is linked to one Czar or one leader. So for those reasons, Yanukovych's Ukraine was very different from Putin's Russia, and should not be compared. If you want to make a parallel with Ukraine, look at Poland, Hungary and Romania after 1989. The only country in Eastern Europe that has a comparable political culture to Russia is Serbia.
It has been postulated that the 2011-12 Moscow protests reaffirmed Putin's aversion to political revolutions within the CIS region, and that the 2012 experience caused the Maidan protests to alarm policymakers in the Kremlin. Do you agree with this theory?
Sergiy Taran: I think this theory has some validity but with one important caveat. I do not think Putin believed that the Maidan unrest would spread to Moscow. What Putin really feared was that if Ukraine joined the EU, reformed its institutions and became a successful country within 3-5 years, it would become an example that would be very threatening for his regime. Russia and the EU have very different standards; Putin was afraid of the Maidan protests not for practical but for strategic reasons.
You mentioned that many Russian speakers opposed Putin's military intervention in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. What explains this resistance, and does this opposition indicate that language is declining as a source of identity polarization in Ukraine?
Sergiy Taran: Language is not the magic indicator for political choice in Ukraine. The emphasis on language is a common stereotype about Ukraine. In Kiev, many people speak Russian yet most of these Russian speakers support pro-European parties. The pro-Russian party did not even receive 1% of the vote in the local elections. In Eastern Ukraine, there are Ukrainian villages that supported Yanukovych for many years. The main regional distinction is that in Western Ukraine, people primarily make decisions based on ideology and the charisma of leaders; while in Eastern Ukraine, decisions are made based on patronage. This is where Putin got it wrong. He thought if he went into an area where more than 51% of Ukrainians spoke Russian, he would get support but that did not work out.
You mentioned political culture differs substantially between Western and Eastern Ukraine. As you are downplaying the role of language, what factors do you think have caused these divergent trajectories?
Sergiy Taran: The regional differences in political culture can be explained by path dependency theories dating back to the industrialization period. Eastern Ukraine was industrialized by Russia, which contributed to its culture of patronage. In the 1990s, there was a political system where half of the deputies were elected on a majoritarian basis and half of the deputies were elected by a party list. Local oligarchs mobilized voters and provided money, goods and patronage. Popular support for the Communist Party did not make sense from an ideological standpoint, but can be explained by patronage. Charismatic authority has started to become important more recently. The regional divides are not always clear-cut, but the differences can be explained by historical legacies.
Why do you think Putin picked Crimea as the starting point for a military intervention in Ukraine and do you think that Putin's military annexations will stop at Eastern Ukraine?
Sergiy Taran: First of all, Crimea was easy to annex because there was already a Russian military presence there. Secondly, Crimea's population had long-standing pro-Russian sentiments. Thirdly, Crimea was an autonomous region within Ukraine, which is a unitary country. Putin's aspirations were to take over Odessa and the entirety of Southern and Eastern Ukraine to create Novorossiya. This plan failed because Putin did not get support in regions where he expected it, like Dnipropetrovsk, which is right next to Donetsk but became an anti-Russian region after the start of the war.
Putin has often cited the need to protect Russian civilians in Ukraine. Do you think this rationale could become a pretext for Putin to launch a military intervention in the Baltic States?
Sergiy Taran: The Baltic States would be at risk if they did not have NATO. That is why I think the biggest mistake Yanukovych made was not joining NATO. If he had insisted Ukraine join, the current war would not have happened.
One major debate in recent months is over the extent to which the West should provide military aid to Ukraine. Do you believe the West should provide lethal arms to Ukrainian militias resisting Russia?Sergiy Taran: I think lethal arms could change the dynamics of the conflict. A relevant precedent is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, where the US gave the rebels missiles that ultimately were crucial in allowing the rebels to defeat the Soviets. If the West could provide the Ukrainian rebels with anti-tank equipment that can detect where Russian tanks are located and missile defense systems, it could make the cost of Russian aggression too high and force Putin to stop. The counter-argument is that providing weapons to Ukraine will merely prolong and exacerbate the conflict. I do not agree with this, as some weapons can make the costs of aggression so high that Russia will stop.
Do you think the West would provide Ukraine with large-scale economic assistance to resist Russia or do you think the dysfunctional nature of Ukraine's political institutions will prevent assistance from being used properly?
Sergiy Taran: I think there needs to be a Marshall Plan for Ukraine as it will help along the reform process. If reforms in Ukraine succeed, it could cause even people in Crimea to want to rejoin Ukraine, though forcing the Crimea issue is not the best strategy right now. The problem in Ukraine is that reforms are uneven across regions. Some regions of Ukraine could buy gas from Europe and other parts of the world; while other regions before Maidan, had only one gas supplier, Russia. However, in some areas reforms are universally inadequate. We clearly need to promote a better environment for business. We have started reforms of local self-government but I think it is too slow.
To what extent do you think Western sanctions have impacted Russian foreign policy? How effective have they been in deterring Russian aggression?
Sergiy Taran: I think they have been effective, and a good help for Ukraine but they are not enough. Pro-Russian militias number 30,000 and Russia, according to my estimates, has 5,000-6,000 military personnel in occupied territories of Ukraine. Sanctions have not helped a lot in reducing Russia's military involvement in Ukraine.
Putin has often described Ukrainian protests and military personnel as Neo-Nazis. How influential in your opinion are far-right movements in Ukraine?
Sergiy Taran: Far-right battalions are effective as soon as they fight. They have a high rate of support. As soon as they start to go to politics, they do not have support. There are some far-right members who began their careers in the Ukrainian army and then gained popular support as individuals but not as battalions. I think the current war could cause Ukraine to resemble Israel, as politicians need to have military service to be electable. Ukraine has not become like that yet, but it is becoming more similar to the Israeli model.
Finally, to what extent do you think pro-Russian sentiment exists in Ukraine? How have pro-Russian supporters survived politically in a period of widespread anti-Russian sentiments triggered by the current conflict?
Sergiy Taran: Pro-Russian parties do exist in the Ukrainian parliament but they have positioned themselves very carefully. They are clearly the most conciliatory organizations towards Russia in Ukraine today but they do not explicitly express support for Russian policies. They use socialist and populist rhetoric; and use poor economic conditions in Ukraine to motivate people with socialist slogans.