Leonid Kravchuk
Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian policymakers have been introspective about the security policy failures that led to war with Russia and the governance problems that have undercut Ukraine’s ability to be a prosperous, democratic state. Even though Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has been largely successful in stymying Russia’s advances into Ukrainian territory and has implemented anti-corruption reforms, the legacies of policies enacted during the 1990s continue to haunt Ukraine and impact its future.
To gain a first-hand perspective on the 1990s policy decisions, which have profoundly shaped Ukraine’s post-1991 political trajectory, I interviewed the first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk at the University of Oxford on March 28, 2017. During our interview, Kravchuk reflected on two of the most controversial decisions of his presidency: the decisions to de-nuclearize Ukraine and uphold Ukrainian foreign policy neutrality. Kravchuk also provided his unique insights into the governance problems that have plagued Ukraine since it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.
Even though many Ukrainian nationalists and Russia hawks have blamed Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas on the erosion of Ukraine’s defensive capabilities during the 1990s, Kravchuk stridently defended Ukraine’s decision to unilaterally abandon its nuclear capabilities in 1994. During our interview, Kravchuk insisted that there was no alternative policy that Ukraine could have implemented, as 165 warheads stored in rockets containing 5 each, remained outside Ukraine’s borders near Nizhny Novgorod in Russia. These warheads could target the United States and ensured that Russian defense policy would profoundly impact Ukraine’s security.
Ukraine’s ability to establish an independent deterrent was also limited, as Ukraine lacked the ability to manufacture its own nuclear warheads during the mid-1990s. The agreement Ukraine signed to hand over its nuclear capabilities was passed in 1997. Kravchuk argued that if Ukraine had kept its nuclear potential after 1997, nuclear weapons would have become very dangerous for regional security. Russian policymakers agreed with this assessment as they argued that the retention of nuclear weapons in Ukraine could have unforeseen consequences. Therefore, Ukraine had no option but to accede to Russia’s demands, as the United States would not incorporate Ukrainian nuclear material during that time period.
To further strengthen his case that Ukrainian security policies did not contribute to Russian aggression, Kravchuk passed the blame on to the signatories of the Budapest memorandum. In Kravchuk’s words, the signatories “betrayed Ukraine,” and treated the agreement “like a piece of paper,” which had little actual policy significance.
This betrayal of the Budapest memorandum has shaken the confidence of many Ukrainians in the credibility of international law. Kravchuk described Ukraine’s intentions as benevolent, and dismissed surprise at Russian conduct, by arguing that Russian violations of international law in Ukraine were “nothing new,” when one considers Russia’s past behavior. As many countries have enabled Russian aggression, Ukraine had to decide whether it abides by international law or not, and should uphold the terms of the documents that it signs.
Even though Russia continues to violate international law through military interventions, Kravchuk still advances a legalistic perspective of diplomacy between Kiev and Moscow. Yet Kravchuk believes that Russian compliance with international law can only occur through diplomatic dialogues between Ukrainian and Russian officials, rather than through coercive diplomacy and sanctions.
This seemingly dovish attitude towards Russia contrasts with hardline rhetoric from contemporary Ukrainian policymakers. Kravchuk’s emphasis on regaining Donbas, even if it results in the permanent loss of Crimea is a striking contrast with Poroshenko’s calls for the complete restoration of lost Ukrainian territory.
For any territorial concessions to occur, Kravchuk believes that Russian policymakers need to abandon their perceptions of Ukraine as a subordinate client state. This shift in thinking can be achieved despite Russia’s overwhelming advantages in terms of military capabilities. In our interview, Kravchuk urged Ukrainian diplomats to speak to their Russian counterparts about the need to uphold international law. Kravchuk also believes that Ukraine’s historical influence in Eastern Europe and Kiev’s status as the capital of Kievan Rus, Russia’s predecessor as a state, presents a powerful argument for Russian nationalists to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty.
While diplomacy could help Ukraine maintain its sovereignty in the short-term, internal political reform is necessary for Ukraine to remain a viable, prosperous state in the long run. As Kravchuk governed Ukraine during the 1990s explosion of privatized corruption, his perspective on Poroshenko’s anti-corruption reforms has unique value. In Kravchuk’s view, Ukrainian policymakers should not distinguish between “good corruption” and “bad corruption” or polarize the state between the facilitators and enemies of corruption.
In place of these traditional distinctions, Kravchuk believes that Ukraine needs to create a political system in which everyone, including the President and Prime Minister follows the rules. If the highest officials express their commitment to the rule of law, Kravchuk believes that corruption will be reduced amongst lower level officials by default.
While many anti-corruption efforts has focused extensively on reducing the power of Ukrainian oligarchs who operate outside the system, corruption within the Ukrainian presidential administration should be regarded as a graver threat to Ukraine’s democratic future. Forcing oligarchs within the system to “separate political power from business,” and rescind their business interests before taking office will greatly advance Ukraine’s economic development.
Even though Ukraine’s foreign policy has undergone radical reorientations in the two decades that followed Kravchuk’s fall from power in 1994, the legacy of his presidency and the challenges that he faced during the early 1990s still have critical relevance for Ukraine’s contemporary political situation. While the Budapest memorandum and Ukraine’s economic transition remain extremely controversial topics in Kiev, Ukrainian policymakers would benefit greatly by heeding Kravchuk’s advice on diplomatic engagement with Russia and reducing corruption in the highest political offices.
Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who writes regularly for the Washington Post, Huffington Post and Diplomat magazine. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.