Sanctions against North Korea. Heed the warnings

Sanctions against North Korea. Heed the warnings
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Surmise is that sanctions will be effective in the stand-off with North Korea. But will they? What exactly is the objective? Force North Korea into policy changes, yes, but how? Can domestic opposition or dissidence inside the leadership be counted on to exercise pressure? How will the targeted country react and how to respond to such reactions? What kind of North Korean regime and its relations with the outside world is envisaged once – hopefully – a modus vivendi is found?

It is not realistic that the North Korean leadership after decades of investments will even consider to give up weapon programs designed to ensure its survival. In the eyes of the population sanctions confirm the assertion that the country is surrounded by enemies, which make it easier to seal it off from the outside world.

From a North Korean angle sanctions augur either strangulation if the nuclear weapons are retained or dismantling such weapons putting themselves at the mercy of the U.S. and other countries they do not trust. Both options are unpalatable with a preemptive strike a third option. Suicide, yes, but condemned to die anyway, why not take some of those who set the trap with them?

The North Korean leadership may also ask the simple question: Suppose agreement is found, what then? Where does it leave North Korea vis-à-vis China, US, Japan, and South Korea? What kind of guarantee does it give the leaders in such a changed environment of which we actually know very little except that it will be fundamentally different?

Sanctions may be necessary for a number of reasons (psychologically, signaling intentions, and politically). To avoid locking North Korea and the U.S. into a trajectory of decisions leading to war, they should be carefully calibrated to keep options open. Good diplomacy consists of widening options, not closing them.

This analysis is based on hard-won experience of sanctions since the 1930s.

In 1935-36 Italy attacked Ethiopia and the League of Nations faced its first – and as it turned out last – challenge. It introduced sanctions, but did not include oil and coal, which were the only commodities that would have made a difference. Fascist Italy went on with the attack. The main result was to push the reluctant Italian fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini, closer to a military pact with Hitler’s Nazi-Germany. Actually the opposite of what France and the UK wanted.

In 1941 the U.S. tightened sanctions vis-à-vis Japan and included oil. This was one of the reasons that a military government replaced a civilian government under Prince Konoe, who, possibly working under unrealistic assumptions, tried to avoid war. The military concluded that U.S. sanctions would cripple Japan forcing it to choose between abandoning its political and military goals or go to war. It chose to go to war seen by the military government as the only option.

There is a somber lesson to heed here. If a nation is pushed with its back to the wall having nothing to lose, it may go to war!

In 1965 the then British colony of Rhodesia opted for Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). Sanctions were introduced and contributed to UDI’s collapse. Later sanctions played a role in pushing South Africa to discard apartheid.

Rhodesia and South Africa present two lessons. Sanctions are effective if applied to a country who basically wants to be a member of the international community and whose population feel uncomfortable castigated for pursuing policies incompatible with good behavior as defined by the international community. Political leaders had a clear perspective of ‘life after death’ so to speak. They knew the future they faced and what was offered with suitable guarantees was acceptable – or at least preferable to fend off outside pressure through sanctions.

Sanctions were applied to stop Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. To a degree the ruling class could live with sanctions using them to rally the nation. The snag was, however, that Iran is a fairly sophisticated society with a considerable number of people questioning the choice made by the regime. In the end, the equation was solved by a fragile compromise between different social groups to rejoin the international community. Sanctions may have worked in this case prompting pressure from below on the leadership.

Russia is a not too dissimilar case after it annexed Crimea in 2014. The regime use sanctions to depict the country as beleaguered, justifying policies, which it likely would have implemented anyway. There probably is pressure from below, but so far the regime has invoked patriotism suppressing dissent. Sanctions may have hurt Russia’s economy, but strengthened the regime’s hold on power.

Joergen Oerstroem Moeller

Visiting Senior Fellow, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

Former State-Secretary, Danish Foreign Ministry.

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