Senator Schumer's Position on the Iran Nuclear Deal: Knowledge or Error?

This essay casts the following questions in a systems analysis paradigm: What if Senator Schumer's is wrong in his assessment? What would be the consequences of that erroneous viewpoint and blunder?
This post was published on the now-closed HuffPost Contributor platform. Contributors control their own work and posted freely to our site. If you need to flag this entry as abusive, send us an email.
NEW YORK, NY - AUGUST 11: U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) speaks at New York University calling for federal and state officials to find a solution to the ailing tunnels used by various rail organizations, including Amtrak, to enter and exit Manhattan on August 11, 2015 in New York City. Schumer also answered questions regarding his stance on President Obama's Iran deal, which he has said he will not support. (Photo by Andrew Burton/Getty Images)
NEW YORK, NY - AUGUST 11: U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) speaks at New York University calling for federal and state officials to find a solution to the ailing tunnels used by various rail organizations, including Amtrak, to enter and exit Manhattan on August 11, 2015 in New York City. Schumer also answered questions regarding his stance on President Obama's Iran deal, which he has said he will not support. (Photo by Andrew Burton/Getty Images)

Co-authored by Guive Mirfendereski

The Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1916), in his book, Knowledge and Error -- Sketches on the Psychology of Enquiry (1905), reminds us that "knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, only success can tell the one from the other."

Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) released a lengthy statement on August 7th setting forth his rationale for his disapproval of the nuclear deal with Iran. The multilateral deal has been negotiated and agreed upon with Iran by US Secretary of State John Kerry and his counterparts from Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the European Union. The agreement has received the unanimous approval of the United Nations Security Council. Senator Schumer has stated that in the last few weeks he has been "carefully studying the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, reading and re-reading the agreement and its annexes, questioning dozens of proponents and opponents, and seeking answers to questions" and then "without regard to pressure, politics or party, make a decision solely based on the merits." The purpose of this essay is neither to dissect Senator Schumer's premises, nor to do so with respect to his interpretation of the facts and evaluation of the quality of his analysis of the deal. Two recent articles, by Professor Muhammad Sahimi and Mr. Jeffrey Lewis, have done a pretty decent job of pointing out Senator Schumer's misunderstandings, e.g., re the "24-day delay" in the inspection process. This essay casts the following questions in a systems analysis paradigm: What if Senator Schumer's is wrong in his assessment? What would be the consequences of that erroneous viewpoint and blunder?

Senator Schumer's decision, like other well-intentioned human operators in complex systems that are constantly processing information and making decisions, is not immune from (human) error. On several occasions, such "errors," i.e., erroneous decisions and blunders have resulted in catastrophic system failures, e.g., Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear power plant accidents in 1979 and 1986, respectively. We believe consequential decisions with profound and long-lasting impact on the safety and fate of the "system" require much higher scrutiny in order to ensure that all conceivable error-inducing factors are fully understood and proactively addressed. According to two UC Berkeley scholars, Professor Todd R. LaPorte and Dr. Paula M. Consolini (1991) "some types of system failures are so punishing that they must be avoided at almost any cost. These classes of events are seen as so harmful that they disable the organization, radically limiting its capacity to pursue its goal, and could lead to its own (and others) destruction."

Professor James Reason of the UK, who is considered a foremost world's authority on human error, has suggested in his latest book, A Life in Error: From Little Slips to Big Disasters (2013) "it is not so much the psychological processes that determine the nature of the outcome; rather it is the circumstances of their occurrences that shape an error's consequences. Activating the kettle rather than toaster in your kitchen can be mildly irritating, but he same kind of switching error committed in the control room of a nuclear power plant or on the flight deck of an aircraft can be disastrous."

Furthermore, unlike operators of many modern complex systems, Senator Schumer's process is devoid of error prevention, error detection, and correction protocols and mechanisms. In his context of decision-making (not to support) and action taking (vote to disapprove) Iran's nuclear deal -- unlike, for instance, nuclear plant operators -- there are no multiple, redundant engineering, administrative and/or procedural controls and protective barriers in the system whose function is to prevent error propagation through the system and thus stop failure. Also, his viewpoint could be quite vulnerable to misinterpretation of informational stimuli. According to his statement, his analysis of the deal is based on his own analysis, or "mental model" of the situation, and made solely by himself. Consequently, he is a one man crew/team in a complex information processing task with no standard operating procedure to follow, no external supervisory oversight process to receive feedback, no cross-check protocol to verify his detection and interpretation of sensory data; no (soft or hard) interlock mechanism to preempt, direct, correct, and prevent his premeditated course of action leading to the decision to "disapprove".

Thus, the onus of error prevention, detection, correction and recovery is solely on Senator Schumer, himself and we hope that the honorable gentleman from New York appreciates this vital fact.

The approval of the deal by the U.S. Congress is of paramount importance to the world and for prospects for peace. It is hoped that Senator Schumer revisits his position and by seeing the potential for error he takes the time and space to reverse the process, thus averting a runaway situation leading to an assured disaster. Of course, the "success" in the future would be the ultimate criterion for ascertaining Senator Schumer's prudence or blunder in decision making. History will render the final judgment; historians will definitely write about his role and legacy, as they have done about Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. In 1919, Senator Lodge, who was an equally powerful and eminent U.S. senator, defied his sitting President Woodrow Wilson and successfully led the opposition to an international accord -- the Treaty of Versailles -- and the League of Nations which was first proposed by President Wilson. It is no secret that Senator Lodge's opposition resulted in the Senate's rejection of the Treaty and the US refusal to join the League, world's first collective security organization. Ultimately, his stance ushered the age of disengagement and isolationism in the US foreign policy, and left the task of maintaining world peace and security to a handful of enfeebled European Powers. Consequently, Hitler tore up the Treaty, militarized the Rhineland, invaded Sudetenland, and the rest became a painful reminder of the price one pays for sitting on the sidelines. What if Senator Lodge had not opposed President Wilson? What if his personal and cognitive biases would have not played a role in his decision-making? Could World War II not have been prevented by a credible concert of Powers that included the United States? Could Hitler and the rise of the Third Reich not have been prevented or contained for the benefit of humanity at large? Nobody knows. Nevertheless, as US Secretary of States James F. Byrnes stated in a speech on 16 November 1945 in Charleston, S.C., "after the first World War we rejected the plea of Woodrow Wilson and refused to join the League of Nations. Our action contributed to the ineffectiveness of the League." Senator Schumer's legacy could drastically be different from Senator Lodge's, as he has the example of Senator Lodge--not to emulate the same myopic view of the world and the dangers that lurk in it. 'Distancing through differencing' real or imagined, defensive strategy is not prudent and leads to failure. Senator Schumer has until September 17th to re-study the facts about the Iran nuclear deal by, among other things, casting the net wider and talking with truly independent and impartial experts. Senator Schumer ought to revisit the facts of the Iran nuclear matter, reevaluate his interpretations, reexamine his mental model, and start the error-recovery process with the knowledge that the disapproval of the deal will leave the world in a weaker place and consequently lead to a situation where the US will have to pay for disengagement by having to engage in military action sometime down the line.

As another former distinguished Senator John F. Kennedy reminds us in Profiles in Courage, "Politics merely furnishes one arena which imposes special tests of courage...For this each man must look into his own soul." Senator Schumer should heed this advice and join in on the right side of history and vote in favor of the deal and urge others to do the same.

And in doing so, he should take the encouragement from the everlasting words of Thomas Jefferson, that, "one man with courage is a majority"...

----------Najmedin Meshkati, a Professor Engineering and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC), was a Jefferson Science Fellow and Senior Science and Engineering Advisor, Office of Science and Technology Advisor to the Secretary of State (2009-2010), has been conducting research on complex systems failure and resiliency for the last 30 years. Guive Mirfendereski, a professorial lecturer in international law and relations, is the author of A Diplomatic History of the Caspian Sea: Treaties, Diaries, and Other Stories (2001) and The Privileged American: The U.S. Capitulations in Iran, 1856-1979 (2015).

Popular in the Community

Close

What's Hot