Syria, for so long a country that’s opaque decision making apparatus and secretive leadership put it off the academic radar, is certainly now back on the agenda. Samer Abboud, an Associate Professor of International Studies at Arcadia University, book ‘Syria’ has joined a growing list of works aimed at understanding the roots and development of the conflict that began in 2011.
As with so many studies on the region’s politics it starts with a brief Ottoman history to trace the roots of the fighting, setting a scene via the emergence of landed elites and more defined class structures to create a context for the rise and rise of the Ba’ath Party. Abboud’s central thesis is that overly simplistic narratives have been used to describe a conflict that is in need of an examination of the complicated and multilayered plurality of actors and relationships that define events. The book attempts to introduce, not in an overly detailed manner, the main parties to the conflict whilst setting out a narrative of its trajectory to date.
This trajectory is set up by an interesting and important look at the underpinnings of the conflict. Abboud explains how Hafez Assad ruled through ‘four pillars of power’; the party, corporatism, state bureaucracy and the army and security apparatus. Of particular interest is how the regime maintained a ‘rural minoritarian character’ and focused efforts on the ‘ruralisation of the security services + state bureaucracy (p.27).
This balance of power was significantly altered when Bashar Assad enacted a reorientation of the Ba’athist model of development described as ‘neo-liberal’ with an authoritarian blend. This would see fundamental changes to the socio-economics of the country but the 'combination of corporatism & repression' (p.46) meant there was little outlet for dissent. The removal of state subsidies and what Abboud describes as ‘rural and agricultural neglect’ (p.37) lead to huge rates of urbanisation combined with a deterioration of living standards during the 2000s. By the late 2000s20 % of the Syrian population lived in ‘slum’ villages where 40% of total housing in urban peripheries was informal.
Abboud gets stuck into the uprising as early as Chapter Two – the central premise being that the authoritarian nature of the regime allowed for no institutions that could express the grievances linked to the changing economic and political circumstances of the 2000s. The opposition was decentralised and uncoordinated – initially this was a strength as it meant they were leaderless and hard to repress but later that disorganisation would prove a weakness as a lack of coherence made it hard to present an alternative vision for the country.
The regime pursued a policy of repression that would force many political actors out of the country where they would lose legitimacy and an ability to influence events. Abboud makes the important point that there was a parallel rise of violence and non-violent actors not a simple militarization of the conflict. He focuses in particular on the importance of the emergence of ‘local coordination committees’ who developed from activism to relief to governance. Indeed civil society in Syria emerged from a standing start in awful conditions to play a central but underreported role. Abboud describes ‘the rise of a robust, committed and active Syrian civil society has been one of the few foreseeable long-term positive impacts of the uprising’ (p.213). These committed activists are a stark contrast to the pre-uprising proliferation of ‘Government Non-Governmental Organisation’ (GONGOs). The author makes the powerful argument that civil society in Syria should be understood to be in a ‘perpetual revolution’ (p.72) against both the regime and armed groups.
In terms of the armed groups themselves Abboud sets out a framework of ‘new war’ theory which has meant the ‘civilianisation’ of conflict with devastating consequences. Meanwhile the huge range of opposition actors and their changing names and alliances are evidence of fluid networks of violence. The multiplicity of actors is also evidence within the regime whose policy of ‘militiafication’ has been adopted to allow groups, most famously the ‘Shabiha’, to be given responsibility for violence and security in parts of the country. Abboud demystifies the shabiha arguing that they ‘should be understood as a genuine expression of regime support from different segments of Syrian society’ (p.109).
Looking at the wider role of international actors the book argues they are ‘perhaps the largest factor explaining the continuity of the conflict’ (p.120). Iran in particular is briefly singled out as the ‘regime is financially and militarily dependent on Iran for its survival’ (p.130). Other aspects of the regional powers involvement are touched upon but not fully investigated. The section on Turkey doesn’t really get to grip with the Kurdish issues and the emergence of ISIS is only lightly explored with simplistic sentences such as ‘territorial expansion is the raison d’etre of ISIS’ (p.107) not doing justice to the complex nuance Abboud is striving to provide.
Indeed whilst providing a more serious investigation than most media reporting the book is more for a generalist rather than specialist audience as it looks under the bonnet of the Syrian conflict but doesn't get into the nuts and bolts. Abboud has a slightly annoying tendency to explain repeatedly what a chapter is attempting to show rather than just doing it and unsurprisingly parts have been overtaken by rapidly moving events.
In terms of looking forward Abboud makes the important argument that holistic solutions need to go beyond the state and that more creative definitions of operative sovereignty – whether federalism or decentralisation – are perhaps where we will eventually get to once sides see a political rather than military route out of the conflict. Sadly this isn’t likely to happen anytime soon.
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