As Lebanon's Pro-US Coalition Fractures, New Opportunities for Peace Emerge
Beirut -- In the depths of summer, and with scant coverage by the US media, one would be forgiven for not having noticed a fairly significant development in Lebanon: the crumbling of the pro-US majority alliance known as March 14.
Despite having narrowly won the recent June 7 elections -- reportedly with the help of $750 million dollars in Saudi money -- the Sunni, Druze and Christian coalition that first took the reins of power in July 2005 following the withdrawal of Syrian troops was dealt what may end up being a lethal blow this past week when the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt formerly left the March 14 Secretariat.
With his exit, the motley alliance lost yet another one of its most able and articulate founding figures -- having previously lost the most popular Christian leader in the country, General Michel Aoun, just before the 2005 elections, and, somewhat differently, having drawn the ire of its former electoral ally, the militant Shiite movement Hezbollah, who promised in late 2006 to never again run on a unified ticket with the main March 14 parties.
The mini earthquake set off by Jumblatt's turn could, however, actually improve the prospects for real peace building in this perpetually unstable Mediterranean nation should the Obama administration, together with its European and Arab allies, accelerate the approach it now seems to be encouraging: an oblique form of diplomacy that deftly seeks to draw in and undermine Hezbollah's rationale and desire to use the frightening array of weapons it now has at its disposal.
This was, of course, not the preferred policy of the Bush administration and March 14 hardliners (including Jumblatt) who, shortly after the Syrians were successfully pressured into leaving, pursued a narrow policy of constant pressure and force as a means of hammering away at both Syria and Hezbollah.
Unfortunately, the result for Lebanon (and US interests) was devastating both in moral and material terms, immediately undercutting the myriad openings and opportunities that Syria's unexpected exit had brought.
Indeed, rather than bolstering stability and patiently encouraging the pro-US tilt of the country, the hawkish line instead helped to foster a sustained and vicious series of assassinations by Damascus, a relatively coherent and (for many Lebanese) reasonably appealing opposition anchored by Hezbollah and its new Christian ally Aoun, near civil war, economic decline and, most notably, the bloody 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel that was reportedly encouraged by leading figures in March 14 and openly championed by the Bush administration as a means of "destroying" Hezbollah once and for all.
As the dust settled in mid 2008, Syria actually came out looking more like the required address for regional stability, while Hezbollah, its domestic reputation partially bruised, nevertheless could claim nearly double the number of rockets compared to 2005 and an enduring political alliance that preserved the opposition's strong hand in Parliament.
In this context, and with a new US president, the tide in Beirut and Washington finally began to turn earlier this year towards a recognition that the original promise of Lebanon's "Cedar Revolution" had gone badly off track and a new strategy was needed.
To this day however, remaining March 14 hardliners, their advocates in the former Bush administration (and some in the current Obama administration) as well as neo-conservative commentators generally still haven't come to terms with the shift, refusing to accept that in the battle of ideas about how best to approach Lebanon's problems, the hawkish approach failed on a range of accounts.
Although it may very well work elsewhere in the world or when applied to other problems, in Lebanon the popular and parliamentary majority now believe otherwise; the Europeans and the Americans, for the most part, now seem to believe otherwise; and even some in the Arab world, such as Saudi Arabia, appear to accept this.
Jumblatt, for his part, finally weighed in by hitting on the crucial point that his recent break with March 14 is not just about protecting his Druze minority; it is also about finding a better way to build peace and enhance justice. In short, the last four years, he says, prove that he was wrong both morally and strategically when he actively encouraged conflict with Syria and Hezbollah as the main (some would say only) pillars of March 14 policy and practice.
Now that these pillars have seemingly fallen, where does this leave Lebanon?
Even though the actual timing of Jumblatt's much anticipated break has momentarily thrown the composition of the next Cabinet into some doubt, the Druze leader's thinking is actually not so far off from that of Saad Hariri, the leader of the Sunnis and the current prime minister designate.
In recent weeks, Hariri has reshuffled his own inner circle and, with Saudi encouragement, led the charge for a national unity government that would numerically deny him the ability to pass or enact anything with just a simple majority vote.
In this formula, one that is likely to stand, Hezbollah and the Christian opposition of General Aoun will also play key roles, with control over a number of ministries.
Crucially, as far as the Obama administration is concerned, there does not seem to be a push back.
In fact, key US policymakers appear to be actively moving in the opposite direction: by not harshly or publicly rebuking Jumblatt, openly suggesting that the mandate of UN troops in South Lebanon should not be changed to more aggressively go after Hezbollah, and by allowing European allies to continue to engage Hezbollah leaders.
In one recent speech, John Brennan, a top security official at the White House, went so far as to offer a reading of Hezbollah whose basic framework -- Hezbollah is not merely a terrorist organization and is open to substantial shifts -- Bush officials would have been loath to even entertain.
While all these developments would seem to signal a real, though belated, shift in the US approach to Lebanon and the key issue of how to deal with Hezbollah's independent arsenal, there remains the distinct possibility that, as in so many other areas of international relations, the US might not go far enough towards achieving a tipping point.
To do this, the US would have to move aggressively on three fronts for which it has hitherto been reluctant to expend real capital: convincing the Israelis that the time has come to hand over to the UN three small parcels of land in South Lebanon claimed by Hezbollah and the Lebanese government (thus ending the issue of occupation); equipping the Lebanese Army with a modest does of heavy weapons to credibly defend the country (substantially undercutting Hezbollah's claim that it is the sole protector of the nation); and, finally, offering strong support to the consensus President in his effort to chip away at the sectarian system of power (a Shiite, for example, cannot be army commander, President or a range of other positions).
Fortunately for the US and for the prospects of a more stable, democratic Lebanon, the time for moving on exactly these kinds of solutions is relatively propitious.
First, after all the conflict of recent years, and given the absence of a direct occupier, most of the parties and their constituents suggest that there is in fact an attractive Grand Bargain to be had: mainly that the Shiites would gradually integrate their own private army (Hezbollah) under the authority of a more robust state and, in return, Shiites (and all citizens) would finally have fair access and say in that authority, regardless of sect.
Second, Hezbollah has clearly been sobered by the election results, with its leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, noticeably muting the Party's increasingly irrational and sometimes wildly belligerent rhetoric of the past three years.
Third, the turmoil of the Iranian elections, HAMAS's current preference for non-military struggle and the general mood of engagement in the region (especially vis-à-vis Syria) precipitated by the Obama administration are all further conspiring to undercut Hezbollah's ability to exercise violence or disrupt credible domestic peace building efforts.
Finally, although both Hezbollah and Israel have been trading high-pitched threats over the past few weeks (as they often do), the reality is that it is not in either actors' interest to start a new conflict now.
This could, of course, change in the future.
In fact, it probably will if decisive, mitigating steps are not taken in the near term.For now, however, the window on a Lebanon-focused solution is wide open, waiting for the main external actor on the domestic scene -- the US -- to decide whether it really wants to test its particular approach to international relations in a country that may be the most amenable in the region to just such an alternative.