Five months into the Qatar crisis, the future outlook for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as an institution of six Arabian countries is gloomy. In light of expectations that the Council will postpone its annual summit— scheduled for next month in Kuwait—and Bahrain’s recent calls for freezing Qatar’s membership in this sub-regional organization, a realistic solution to the Gulf dispute appears nowhere on the horizon. As Kuwaiti, American, French, and Russian efforts to promote a diplomatic settlement prove futile, the GCC is unraveling.
The lack of a response to the GCC crisis from the organization’s secretary general—a Bahraini national accused of favoring his government’s position—highlights the Council’s institutional weakness. If the GCC is designed to protect the security of all six members, how could an effectual Council permit three of its members and a non-GCC country—Egypt—to impose a blockade and wage a media war of narratives against a founding member? The GCC’s charter calls for unanimous support from all its members for any substantive changes to the institution. So, how would Bahrain’s plan—presumably backed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—for suspending Qatar’s membership play out in practice given half of the GCC members’ opposition to such an unprecedented measure?