greece economic crisis

This is the largest -- but by no means first -- wave of arrivals in the country.
Although the eurozone is better equipped than it was in the past, it is still a highly imperfect monetary union. In fact, if Greece exits, new vulnerabilities will emerge, and there is no certainty other weak southern periphery economies will actually be protected. This may add to the many reasons for the two parties to reach an agreement this week, allowing Greece to remain in the eurozone. The alternative could be the beginning of the end of the euro.
DUBLIN -- The decisive nature of the No vote should persuade European leaders to set aside their hopes of forcing regime change and to focus their minds on the practical implications of a Grexit. They need to acknowledge something that is widely accepted: that Greece cannot pay back all of the money loaned by Europe. Pushing Greece towards a euro exit  is probably the strategy that will ultimately minimize the return of money to the creditors.
Unlike many letters from Congress that are ignored by the executive branch, this one might be taken more seriously by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury department -- which is the IMF's most powerful overseer. One reason is that the IMF has been trying for five years to enact reforms in its governance structure that are very important to the Fund and Treasury -- reforms that can't be enacted unless they are approved by Congress.
Defaults are difficult. But even more so is austerity. The good news for Greece is that, as Argentina showed, there may be life after debt and default.
European leaders are finally beginning to reveal the true nature of the ongoing debt dispute, and the answer is not pleasant: it is about power and democracy much more than money and economics.
BUENOS AIRES -- Athens in 2015 will become like Buenos Aires in 2001. Greeks now face the prospect of prolonged capital controls, severe political unrest and eventually a confiscation of ordinary citizens' savings to finance a government's withdrawal from the world.