The U.S. has been very fortunate not to have nuked itself with multiple hydrogen bombs over the last 70 years.
Chernobyl's 30th Anniversary (and Fukushima's 5th): A Tale of Preventable Nuclear Accidents and the Vital Role of Safety Culture
The world commemorates the 30th anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant catastrophic accident in Ukraine on April 26, 2016.
In both Chernobyl and Fukushima, before disaster began to unfold, few imagined that such a catastrophe was possible. In the United States, too, despite the knowledge since 1945 that nuclear power, at war or in peacetime, holds dangers of a stunning sort, the general attitude remains: it can't happen here.
The Day After the "Implementation Day" of the Nuclear Deal With Iran: Prospects for Scientific Cooperation, Safety and Sustainability in the Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf - a semi closed body of water - is at a serious crossroad and facing an uncertain future. Its population
Given the intense focus on Iran's intentions, it is logical that arms control issues dominate discussions about nuclear power in the Middle East. But receiving far too little attention are questions about nuclear safety. The lessons of Chernobyl and Fukushima must be kept in mind regardless of how new nuclear capabilities are employed.
Fukushima's Unsung Heroes and Implications of the New Seminal Report by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences for the Future of (Japan's) Nuclear Power Industry
Without respecting and understanding the vital role of human factors in technological systems and proactively addressing/cultivating/facilitating their performance during unexpected events, nuclear safety will only be a distant mirage and recovery will be an unattainable dream.
On March 11, 2011, Japan experienced a 9.0 earthquake. The six nuclear plants at Fukushima Daiichi survived the quake but were swamped by a 45-foot wave that overwhelmed the 19-foot seawalls. In the ensuing three years, we learned four grim truths.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is investigating possibly major lapses in security at the Indian Point nuclear power plants, including the prospect that criminal elements are using parts of the plants' drills for their own training.
The potential energy released in a gas line rupture at Indian Point is equivalent to that from a massive conventional bomb
The deputy director's official objection, called a "non-concurrence" in NRC parlance, further argues: "1.0 might not sound