A highly significant fatwa (religious decree) issued last year by Grand Ayatollah Sayid Ali Al-Sistani surfaced in the midst of a heated debate about the fate of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in light of the impressive accomplishments of Iraqi Armed Forces in Mosul against the self-described Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Before analyzing the content and significance of the fatwa, issued by the highest living Shia religious authority, in response to a question posed to him by a follower, let us look at the text:
"Question:
In 2014, when Mosul and other large areas of Iraq in the hands of Daesh, you called, in the Friday Prayer Sermon, for a non-categorical defense (difa’a kifa’i), and since that day, many areas were liberated and the threat to many cities has been removed. Is this call still standing, or the volunteers can return to their normal occupations? Please give us a fatwa on this regard, may you be rewarded [by God].
Answer:
In His exalted name
We have issued a decree (fatwa) mandating the joining of [Iraqi] Armed Forces, as a non-categorical obligation (wujoub kifa'i), to defend the people, territories, and sacred places of Iraq. This decree (fatwa) is still valid and binding due to the continued existence of the reason of its issuance, despite the progress accomplished by the heroic fighters in defeating the terrorists."
Ali Al-Husseini Al-Sistani
27/3/1437 (1 July 2016)
When ISIS captured large territories in Iraq in June 2014, taking advantage of a demoralized Iraqi military, Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa calling on Iraqi “Citizens to defend the country, its people, the honor of its citizens, and its sacred places.” In response to this fatwa tens of thousands of Iraqis, young and old, took up arms and enlisted to fight the existential terrorist threat and stopped it in its tracks before it accomplished its goal of taking Baghdad and other cities. While the June 2014 fatwa called on private Iraqi citizens to join the armed forces, Iraq’s defense institutions were not in a position to absorb, train, and equip the overwhelming flow of volunteers into the devastated military divisions in and around the ISIS-threatened areas. This inability to take a sufficient number of volunteers and the dire need to rescue the country facilitated the re-emergence of militant organizations that dropped their arms after the withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq before, or at the end of 2011. With the help of Iranian weapons and advisory assets, they recruited thousands of volunteers and divided areas of responsibility among themselves, with various levels of coordination with the Iraqi military.
Eventually, and as the need for more forces emerged, fresh organizations were formed. Iraq’s government, out of desperation, welcomed the volunteers, who gave the Iraqi military a chance to collect its breath and regroup. A new government entity was formed and attached to the Council of Ministers under the name of Hay’at al-Hashd al-Sha’bi, or Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC). With the passage of time, the PMF grew in size and diversity as tens of thousands joined its rank and file: Sunnis, Christians, Yazidis, and others. According to the PMC, the number of non-Shia members of the PMF stands now at 40% of the total force – although its local, regional and Western critics call it “Shia Militia”. The government took another step by having the Iraqi Parliament pass a law recognizing the PMF and considering them a lawful component of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), with provisions to restructure them according to the official system of the ISF.
One of the controversies surrounding the PMF was the question of their genesis and loyalty. While most outsiders, and some Iraqis, have set their mind on considering these forces as “Iran-backed Shia militias”, there are two competing narratives among Iraq’s anti-ISIS population. The first version views the PMF as a nationalist force that took up arms and defended the country after being inspired by Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa. Proponents of this view give the full credit for the PMF work to the Grand Ayatollah and the sense of responsibility and patriotism that made these men sacrifice everything they have to rescue a country whose government was too incompetent and corrupt to perform its role in securing the country and whose foreign allies are not reliable. The second narrative is pushed by past and current Iraqi Government officials who claim the credit of forming the PMF and enabling it to achieve the extraordinary accomplishments. As Iraq approaches the elections season – the Provincial and General Elections in 2017 and 2018 respectively – the unmatched popularity of the PMF among Iraqi voters is too precious a prize to waste by the demonstrably bankrupt Iraq political elite.
Meanwhile, certain Iraqi politicians, especially those who counted on ISIS to turn the Iraqi political equation in their favor, intensified their calls to dismantle the PMF, and others are echoing these demands citing the impressive progress in the fight against ISIS. These calls also have their proponents among the international circles of influence, especially in Washington, while, the Iraqi Government, and partucularly Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, are suffocating by the pressure from both sides. When asked about the PMF in Washington, PM Al-Abadi gave a pro-western prescription of what is next for these forces, but as soon as he returned to Baghdad, he spent a great deal of time on damage control, essentially telling PMF leaders the opposite of what he said in Washington.
In the midst of this debate, the inner circle of Grand Ayatollah Al-Sistani circulated this fatwa (originally dated on 1 July 2016) to send a message to all parties that it is premature to start making decisions about the PMF. One of the most important aspects of the fatwa is that it documents in writing the fatwa of June 14, 2014, which was issued verbally by Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s representative in Karbala during a Friday Prayer sermon. Many people challenged the essence of this being a fatwa in the first place. With this 2016 fatwa, the one of 2014 became documented and authenticated by the personal seal of Grand Ayatollah Sistani himself – fatwas may be issued verbally by a trusted representative of the Grand Ayatollah, by his office with the seal of the office, or most emphatically by the Grand Ayatollah’s office with his personal seal – and it goes further to say that the 2014 fatwa is still valid because the Grand Ayatollah still views the danger of terrorism and the treat to Iraq as clear and present. Although he acknowledged the great progress that Iraqi fighters accomplished in the fight against ISIS, Grand Ayatollah Sistani is not satisfied with the level of security and the readiness of Iraqi forces to protect Iraq going forward, without the help of the PMF.
The other important aspect of the 2016 fatwa is that it confirms the original goal of the 2014 fatwa was not to form militias, but to support Iraq’s armed forces by a legitimate fighting force. He reiterated his original phrasing of the call for “joining of [Iraqi] Armed Forces, as a non-categorical obligation (wujoub kifa'i), to defend the people, territories, and sacred places of Iraq.” Furthermore, the emphasis on Iraq, as the territory to defend, indicates clearly that Grand Ayatollah Sistani is not putting his clout and authority behind any effort to fight elsewhere. All those leaders of fighting groups, and Iraqi politicians, who send forces outside Iraqi borders, or those who talked about sending them in the future can no longer hide under the mantle of Grand Ayatollah Sistani and cite the 2014 fatwa, or interpret it broadly to cover side fights outside Iraq.
The fatwa also affirms that Grand Ayatollah Sistani stands behind the PMF and continues to support them – he already called them “our pride and our glory” in a previous occasion – and sends a message that the dismantling of the PMF is not in the hands of the Iraqi government or anyone else. Grand Ayatollah Sistani was the founder of the PMF and he remains the one who holds the exclusive authority to tell its fighters to go home. So far, he does not see the time is right for such a decision.
Abbas Kadhim is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University and the Founding President of the Institute of Shia Studies. He may be followed on Twitter: @DrAbbasKadhim