Dexter Filkins's compelling and elucidating reporting from the ground in Afghanistan is second to none, and his latest article in the New York Times entitled "Inside Corrupt-istan, a Loss of Faith in Leaders" is no exception. Yet, although Filkins expertly exposes government corruption as the most destabilizing factor in Afghan society, he relays only half of the story while Afghans remain bereft a solution.
To his credit Filkins does hint at a possible remedy by highlighting pleas from the editors of the Kabul Weekly who say Afghanistan is a nation "in desperate need of more heroes." Filkins interprets the tone of the editorial as less angry than poignant, as if time were running short -- a very accurate assessment indeed.
Filkins, with his rigorous and often death-defying journalistic acumen, now has an opportunity to become a hero himself -- by helping the Afghans find theirs. According to the New World Strategies Coalition (NWSC), a political and economic think tank founded by Afghan natives, Filkins just needs to talk to the right people, such as key tribal elders who can provide him with glimpses of Afghanistan's past -- of a golden era of peace, where the path to stability and prosperity must begin.
It's beyond dispute that government corruption is the bane of General David Petraeus' counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy because it breeds animosity amongst the villages. As the General laid out in his COIN guidance:
"The Taliban are not the only enemy of the people. The people are also threatened by inadequate governance, corruption, and abuse of power -- recruiters for the Taliban."
Transparency International ranks Afghanistan 179th in the world in terms of corruption -- edging out only Somalia -- while those who try to fight government malfeasance are removed, such as deputy attorney general Fazel Ahmad Faqiryar who attempted to prosecute members of Afghan President Hamid Karzai's inner circle.
If it is true, as French army officer and counterinsurgency theorist Roger Trinquier put it, that "the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of a population," then Karzai's very existence as head of state is irreconcilable with capturing the hearts and minds of Afghans. Thus, unless something changes at the top, it would be reasonable to conclude that this war is now unwinnable.
According to Filkins, the U.S. and NATO know who the most corrupt figures are and have even created a criminal syndicate chart of "maligned actors" that connects politicians, drug traffickers and insurgents. These miscreants are no secret to the average Afghan on the street either. Filkins interviewed one gentleman in Kabul who suggested killing the top 50 corrupt officials by putting them on a plane and crashing it into a mountain.
Though Filkins certainly did not endorse this approach, one can easily be tempted by the notion that simply ridding the country of this "greedy cabal" would resolve Afghanistan's problems. But the opposite is true because it would just exacerbate the situation, just as American commanders told Filkins: "Taking down the biggest Afghan politicians could open a vacuum of authority. And that could create instability that the Taliban could take advantage of."
Even if you gave President Karzai and his mob-boss brother Ahmed Wali Karzai first-class tickets to hell, the corruption that plagues the Afghan government would not evaporate because it is now systemic. Which is a shame because this level of corruption is not an indigenous Afghan trait -- it was brought to Afghanistan via C.I.A.-funded violent extremists from Pakistan after the Soviets destroyed the tribal structure during the 80s and Afghanistan was left for the most part leaderless, lawless and in the hands of murderers like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Corruption was further fueled during the post-Taliban period when the D.O.D. and the C.I.A. paid off these same warlords to keep the peace as America embarked on its Iraq excursion.
However, according to NWSC leaders -- all is not lost. A profound societal change is needed that must start at the top. That vacuum of authority can be filled by a legitimate, unifying national leader that is seen as uncorrupt and trustworthy and has the capacity to build an independent nation.
The importance of tribal lineage and custom in Afghan society cannot be overstated -- in certain areas, tribal tradition even trumps Islam. Bloodline is a key factor in determining whether a person is worthy to be a leader at the national level, and there is no bloodline more respected than that of the Mohammadzai clan, from which a new leader could be chosen.
A royal Mohammadzai descendant would have the pedigree to win the support of every tribe, clan, sub-clan and ethnicity from every province in Afghanistan. Remaining neutral throughout decades of ceaseless civil war, the Mohammadzais have managed to avoid getting blood on their hands.
The Mohammadzais fall under the sacred umbrella of the Pashtun Duranni tribe, which ruled Afghanistan for more than 200 years. One of those rulers was King Zahir Shah who presided over the most peaceful era in Afghan history -- a run lasting forty years until ousted by a family coup in 1973 that exiled the former royal family to Rome.
To illustrate the appeal and unifying power of the Mohammadzai King, when the Taliban took over the country in the mid-90s they were able to run roughshod through each province because, not only did they pay off Afghan leaders, but Taliban commanders carried pictures of King Zahir Shah with them and deceived everyone by claiming they were going to bring the king back once Kabul fell.
In fact, Zahir Shah was actually selected over Karzai to fill the post-Taliban vacuum in 2002 by three-quarters of the participants of an Emergency Loya Jirga. However, U.S. officials interfered to prevent that from happening. As Elizabeth Gould and Paul Fitzgerald put it in Invisible History: Afghanistan's Untold Story:
Forbidden in a last-minute frenzy from functioning as head of state by Bush envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, the long awaited return of the king as a symbol of a new, united Afghanistan was wasted. Without the king as the traditional center of Afghan life and politics, any hope of binding the multiethnic Afghan personality together once again, as one nation, would prove a pointless enterprise.
Any solution that is implemented must have the support of Pakistan's government and military, or else Afghanistan will never see peace. Key Pakistani military and intelligence officials have indicated to the NWSC that a Mohammadzai-led government in Kabul would be an agreeable alternative.
Flying the top 50 most corrupt Afghan figures into a mountain can be avoided by charging these leaders with crimes against the state, considering more evidence against Karzai can be compiled through open source intelligence alone than what Woodward and Bernstein had amassed against Nixon through intensive investigations. Meanwhile, the Afghan people could select their new leader via Afghan custom by holding another loya jirga, but this time one that is free of external meddling.
Although Filkins is running out of time to uncover the solution, hopefully he finds reassurance in simply knowing one exists.
Michael Hughes writes similar articles as the Afghanistan Headlines Examiner and the Geopolitics Examiner for Examiner.com.