The Twisted Results of the Surge

Ashley Smith has just published a fine article in the International Socialist Review analyzing the consequences of Bush's surge. It is short and to the point, and it frames the situation in Iraq very well. Here is a brief summary of what I think are the most important points:

* There is indeed a decline in violence. It is a good thing for the Iraqis but the level of fighting is still very high, the same as in 2005; so that Iraq is still the hottest war zone in the far.

* The surge is not the cause of the decline in violence. In fact, the surge produced has been the worse year for U.S. casualties, car bombs and other kinds of violence. The decline has occurred only in the last few months and mainly in Anbar and Baghdad, after the U.S. abandoned the surge (without saying that it had).

* In Anbar the decline occurred after the U.S. abandoned the surge strategy -- which attempted to blast the insurgents out of their neighborhoods -- and instead agreed to an alliance with Sunni insurgents it had been attempting to destroy. The U.S. agreed to give up its attempt to get control of the communities and the insurgents agreed to get rid of the jihadists (who do suicide attacks).

* This alliance is sure to be temporary, because the Sunni insurgents the U.S. is now paying and lauding continue to call for the complete withdrawal of American troops. They also vocally and violently oppose the Iraqi government. In the end, the U.S. will either have to withdraw (no sign of that) or else fight these insurgents again, either to root out the anti-American resistance fighters or to defend the Maliki government.

* The decline in violence in Baghdad a result of the homogenization of various neighborhoods and because the Sadrists (the Mahdi Army) have declared a cease fire in their fight to expel the US.

* Most neighborhoods that used to be mixed Shia and Sunni are now Shia. (This has occurred in large part because of the invasions of these neighborhoods by the U.S., which destroyed the Sunni militias) followed by the Shia death squads, who drove the remaining Sunnis out). A few are now all Sunni (because Sunni militias have driven out the Shia, often with U.S. support). All in all, the city is now 75% Shia, compared to 65% Sunni a decade or so ago.

The decline in violence in Baghdad may therefore be more permanent because these expulsions cannot be reversed. But the eviction of Sunnis has created about one million new refugees, internally or in neighboring countries. These refugees are themselves a huge humanitarian issue and they are also a source of further instability that the U.S. and the Maliki government is doing nothing about.

* The U.S. is not trying to overwhelm the Mahdi army during the cease fire, and the Mahdis are reorganizing and consolidating. In the meantime, their leader, Muqtada al Sadr, has made it clear that his first and primary goal is to expel the U.S. The fighting between the U.S. and the Sadrist will re-escalate unless the U.S. withdraws (which, as we know, is not currently on the horizon)

* All in all, there is still a major war going on, and there are three potential sources of escalated disruption and fighting: (1) the renewal of hostilities between the U.S. and its new Sunni insurgent allies, who continue to demand complete U.S. withdrawal from the country; (2) the demands of the vast number of refugees who have no place to go; and (3) the Sadrists, who are just biding their time before making a new attempt to expel the U.S. from their neighborhoods and the country.